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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court
Leslie Mower ("Mower") asked and authorized her husband, Ken Dolezsar

("Dolezsar"), to assemble and acquire a large amount of property in Hobble Creek
Canyon on which to build a horse ranch and equestrian center. After Dolezsar's
death, Mower apparently became unhappy with the way her husband accomplished
the task. She then filed a Complaint (R. 1-15) against David Simpson ·

("Simpson''), who assisted Dolezsar in finding and acquiring parcels for project,
(2) two companies that were related to Simpson and that briefly held title to certain
parcels as they were being assembled, 1 and (3) Kristin Mackey and John Mackey.
The Simpson Defendants moved for summary judgment. (R. 224-26.)
Mower opposed the motion (R. 367-83) and submitted the affidavit of Paul Reeb
(R. 384-87). A week later, Mower submitted a short declaration of her own. (R.
485-87.)

1

These two companies are the appellees Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant
Meadows, LLC. Unless otherwise noted, these two companies-together with
Simpson-are referred to collectively in this brief as the "Simpson Defendants."

The districtootirt-held oral argument on the Simpson Defendants' summary
judgment motion (R. 802-804), and it carefully considered the arg1µ11ents of
counsel and all of the papers and pleadings on file. The district court ruled that,
based on the undisputed facts, the Simpson Defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw. (R. 808-821.) Mower filed a motion to reconsider (R. 827933), which the court denied (R. 997-99). Mower then filed this appeal. (R. 116062.)

Statement of Facts
T~e district court found that certain facts were undisputed. The court
specifically noted that
each and every one of the 19 statements of undisputed facts set forth
in the Simpson Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment is supported by a combination of:
1.
Very detailed citations to, or quotes from, various
depositions;
2.
Citations to numerous exhibits attached to the
memorandum in support;
3.
Citations to the Complaint.
(R. 815.) The district court also noted that "the Plaintiffs make no citation to any
deposition, no citation to any affidavit, and no citation to any exhibit." Id.
Furthermore, the district court found:
[T]he Plaintiffs do not supportively challenge the interpretation of any
relied upon testimony from any deposition; they do not claim the
language was misinterpreted, taken out of context, or that any other
depositional testimony was contrary in nature or content. They do not
challenge any of the Simpson Defendants' citations.
2

Id.

For all of these reasons, the district court ruled that the following facts are
undisputed.2 This following list is a verbatim quotation from the district court's
ruling (R. 817-19):
1.

In 2005, Mower wanted to purchase enough property in Hobble Creek

Canyon for a horse ranch and equestrian center.
2.

Mower's since deceased husband, Kenneth Dolezsar ("Dolezsar"),

worked with David Simpson ("Simpson") to assemble and acquire enough
property for a horse ranch and equestrian center and instructed that the properties
be acquired in the name of nominees·.
3.

· Simpson never had any conversations with Mower regarding the

purchase and acquisition of any of the properties assembled by Simpson and
Dolezsar for a horse ranch and equestrian center..
4.

On or about March 3, 2005, Simpson, as the managing member of

Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee, purchased approximately 268 acres of land in
Hobble Creek Canyon (the "Crandall Parcel" in connection with assembling
property for the a horse ranch and equestrian center.
5.

The purchase price of the Crandall Parcel was $2,000,000 and was·

2

Even now in this appeal Mower does not identify how she specifically challenged
any of these facts.
3

paid as follows:
(a) $200,000 to Carolyn Crandall;
(b) $200,000 to Joan Orton;
(c) $200,000 to Cathleen C. Lloyd; and
(d) $1,400,000 to Exchange Pro, Inc. as accommodator for Crandall
Hobble Creek Ranch, L.L.C., LaMar V. Crandall, operating manager.
6.

On or about February 15, 2006, Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee,

purchased additional property in Hobble Creek Canyon in connection with
assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian center (the "Storrs Parcel").
7.

On or about July 3, 2006, Sirnpson as manager of~heasant Meadows,

LLC, as nominee, acquired additional property in Hobble Creek Canyon in
connection with assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian center (the
"Olsen Parcel").
8.

On or about March 23, 2006, Wood Springs, LLC, as nominee,

entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract for additional land in Hobble Creek
Canyon in connection with assembling property for a horse ranch and equestrian
center (the "Thornhill Parcel"). The owner of the Thornhill Parcel, Hobble Creek
Investments, agreed to sell the Thornhill Parcel in exchange for the following:
a. $1,750,000,
b. approximately 6.5 acres of the Crandall Parcel, and

c. approximately 4.5 acres of property owned by Kristin Mackey.
9.

Previous to and independent of the effort to assemble property for a

Mower horse ranch and equestrian center, on or about August 4, 2005, Kristin
Mackey purchased approximately 49 acres of land in Hobble Creek Canyon (the
"Mac~y Parcel"). Approximately 33 acres were located on the west side of the
road and approximately 16 acres was located on the east side of the road.
10.

Kristen Mackey agreed to transfer 7.0 acres of her property interest to

the owners of the Thornhill Parcel in exchange for the Storrs and Olsen Parcels.
Mackey agreed to transfer to Mower or her interests 12 to 14 acres of the Mackey
Parcel that were not necessary for obtaining a building permit for the Mackey
Parcel from Utah County.
11.

To acquire the Thornhill Parcel required a three way trade involving

the Crandall Parcel, the Mackey Parcel and the Storrs/Olsen Parcels. The
Storrs/Olsen Parcels were to be deeded to Mackey; Mackey would then transfer to
the owners of the Thornhill Parcel an interest in the Mackey Parcel. Also, a
portion of the Crandall Parcel would be deeded to the owner of the Thornhill
Parcel.
12.

The three-way trade occurred as follows:
(a) The Storrs Parcel was transferred to Mackey on August 24, 2006;
(b) The Olsen Parcel was transferred to Mackey on August 24, 2006;
5

( c) Mackey transferred to the own~r of the Thornhill Parcel a Right of
Use Easement on August 27, 2006;
_(d) The 6.5 acres of the Crandall Parcel was transferred to the owner
of the Thornhill Parcel on April 27, 2006;
(e) On August 8, 2006, Simpson, on behalf of Wood Springs, LLC, as
nominee, and Mackey executed an agreement (the "Reconveyance Agreement")
whereby they agreed to transfer to Wood Springs the 12 to 14 acres of the Mackey
Parcel that would not be necessary for Mackey to obtain a building permit on the
(a) ..

remaining Mackey Parcel combined with the-Storrs/Olsen Parcel.
13.

The title to the Thornhill Parcel was transferred to Wood Springs,

LLC, as nominee, on April 27, 2006.
14.

LD, Ranch, LLC constructed an equestrian center on the Thornhill

Parcel.
15.

LD Ranch, LLC is a limited liability company of which Leslie Dee

Mower is the sole member.
16.

On or about July 17, 2007, Wood Springs transferred to LD Ranch,

LLC all of the Thornhill Parcel and all of the Crandall Parcel less 6.5 acres traded
to acquir"e th_e Thornhill Parcel.
17.

Mower has never accepted the deeds to the 12-14 acres from the

Mackey Parcel.
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is one central, undeniable, and dispositive fact that renders all of
Mower's arguments and disputes immaterial. The simple fact is that Leslie Mower
asked and authorized her husband, Dolezsar, to acquire property for a horse ranch
and equestrian center. Dolezsar was Mower's agent. His actions were her actions.
His knowledge was her knowledge.
It does not ·matter that Dolezsar could have acquired different parcels for the
equestrian center. It does not matter that he might have been able to pay cash for
properties instead of trading for them. It does not matter that Dolezsar might have
able to trade a different parcel than the one he actually traded. It do~s not matter
that he obtained the assistance of David Simpson instead of someone else. It does
not matter that Dolezsar may not have informed Mower of all of the details of his
efforts. It does not matter that Mower would have done things differently if she
had assembled the parcels herself instead of relying on her husban~ and agent. The
simple fact is that Dolezsar was Mower's agent, and she is bound by his actions.
This one undisputed fact is fatal to all of Mower's arguments, and the district court
correctly granted summary judgment.
.@

In addition, Simpson was not acting as a real estate agent for Mower. There
was no admissible evidence before the Court to the contrary.

7

ARGUMENT

As shown below, the district court did not err in finding that the material
facts in this case were not disputed. Based upon those facts, the district court
properly ruled that the Simpson Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on each of the causes of action contained in Mower's complaint.

I. ·

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE MATERIAL FACTS WERE NOT DISPUTED.

As Mower admits in her brief to this Court, a trial court "has discretion" to
"grant summary judgment for noncompliance with rule 7(c)(3)(B)." Appellants'
Opening Brief on Appeal at 24 (quoting Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding
Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119,, 24,208 P.3d 1077). Here the trial court did not

abuse its discretion, and-contrary to Mower's suggestion-it did not rely on a
hyper-technical reading of the rule. Mower offers no explanation as to why she
could not have complied with the rule. Nevertheless, the district court patiently
considered her arguments, including giving careful consideration of her motion for
reconsideration. (R. 997-99. )- The district court even held oral argument on ~he
motion for reconsideration. (R. 993.)
In the end, Mower simply did not demonstrate that there was any genuine
dispute regarding the facts alleged (and carefully supported) by the Simpson
Defendants. As one example, the Simpson Defendants cited to specific deposition
testimony demonstrating that Kristin Mackey had purchased certain property that
8

was eventually acquired for Mower's horse ranch. (R. 231.) Mower disputed
Simpson's factual statement on the basis that "Mackeys have not proved to the
satisfaction of Plaintiffs that they properly acquired the Mackey parcel." (R. 372.)
Proving a fact to the satisfaction of an opposing party has never been a requirement
for summary judgment. This type of response does not represent even a good faith
attempt to comply with the rules. The district court simply did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that Simpson's facts were deemed admitted under Rule 7.

II.

EVEN IF MOWER'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE RULES IS
IGNORED, THE MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT IN DISPUTE.
In her brief to this Court, Mower claims that the district judge ignored her

evidence, relied upon technicalities, and unfairly penalized her for her failure to
follow the rules of civil procedure. This is incorrect. As shown below, (I) there
are really only two issues that matter here, (2) the declaration of Paul Reeb (R.
384-87) did not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding either of those
issues, and (3) Mower's late-filed declaration (R. 485-87) was inadmissible.

A.

MOWER'S CLAIMS ARE PREMISED ON JUST TWO
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES.

After sifting through Mower's late-filed declaration (R. 485-87) and her
memorandum in support of her motion to reconsider (R. 827), it is evident that
there are really only two material facts that Mower attempted to dispute. The first
issue is whether Mower's husband was her agent. The second issue is whether
9
·(itli)

Simpson was acting as a real e~tate agent such that he owed fiduciary and other
duties to Mower. As shown below, there is no genuine dispute about ei~her issue.
1.

Mower's Husband Was Her Agent.

As a matter of law and undisputed fact, Mower's husband was her agent.
Mower testified at her deposition that she gave to her now-deceased husband, Ken
Dolezsar, a general power of attorney. Specifically, Mower testified that Dolezsar
"was managing whatever affected me. So whatever affected me Ken had power of
attorney to take care of in my stead." (R. 54 7 at 165: 11-13.)
The following facts· are supported by Mower's own deposition testimony:

I.

Dolezsar was a joint owner of the bank account which was the source

of the funds for the purchase of the properties, and Dolezsar signed the checks for
the purchase of the property. (R. 548 at 111: 19-21.)
2.

Dolezsar was Mower's only source of information regarding the

acquisition of the ranch properties. (R. 548 at 109: 1-12.)
3. ·

Dolezsar was the only person Mower worked with because she got

home very late and worked weekends. (R. 549 at 11 7: 14-19.)
4.

Dolezsar was well aware of the details of every transaction that is the

subject of this lawsuit. (R. 547 at 108: 2-15.)
The evidence is clear that Mower gave to Dolezsar the actual authority to
take all steps necessary to acquire the property for their ranch. She even put him
10

on the bank account with full authority to spend the money in that account on his
signature alone.
Mower argues in her brief that she did not give her husband a written power
of attorney until after the transactions in this case were concluded. However, a
written document is not necessary to establish actual authority. Moreover, a
written document giving Dolezsar actual authority does exist in this caseDolezsar is a signatory on the bank account from which the purchased funds crune,
and he was a named joint owner of that account. .
The law provides that an agent's knowledge is imputed to her/his principal.

Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, if 27, 134 P.3d l 12~.
"Imput~d" means:
attributed vicariously; that is, an act, fact, o·r quality is said to be
"imputed" to a person when it is ascribed or charge~ to him, not
because he is personally cognizant of it or responsible for it, but
because another person is, over whom he has control or for whose acts
or knowledge he is responsible.

Black's Law Dictionary 891 (4 th ed. 1968). In her untimely declaration, Mower
claimed that she didn't know what was going on with the acquisition of land for
the ranch. However, this factual position-even if true-does not create a material
issue of fact for purposes of summary judgment because Dolezsar' s knowledge is
imputed to his wife.

11

Furthermore, even ifDolezsar did not have actual authority, he was certainly
.?lothed with apparent authority. "Where the principal does something to support a
third party's reasonable belief that the agent has the authority to act, that agent is
vested with apparent authority to bind the pripcipal." Grazer v. Jones, 2012 UT
58, ,r 11, 289 P.3d 437. The above-stated facts, including putting Dolezsar on the
bank account as a signatory with absolute authority over the funds, is more than
sufficient to communicate to third parties that Dolezsar had the authority with
regard to these transactions.
Thus, although Mower argues that the trial court ignored factual disputes
and penalized her too harshly for not following the rules of civil procedure, the
actual situation was that there were no genuine issues regarding whether Dolezsar
was Mower's agent. Mower said it best herself: Ken "was managing whatever
affected [her]," and "whatever affected [her] Ken had power of attorney to take
care of in [her] stead." (R. 547 at 105: 11-13.)

2.

Simpson Was Not Acting as a Real Estate Agent.

The only other material issue of fact is whether David Simpson was acting
as a real estate agent for Mower. First of all, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(e)
specifically precludes a person from claiming that someone was acting as a real
estate agent unless there is an agreement is in writing. Mower admits that there is

12

no such writing. This should end the inquiry. However, even if the statute were
not fatal to Mower's claim, her argument is contradictory and makes no sense.
Mower testified that she never_had any communications with Simpson
regarding the acquisition of any of the properties that were assembled for her and
her husband. (R. 548 at 109: 1-12.) In fact, Mower is adamant that she would
never have hired Simpson as a real estate agent. Although she pleaded with
Dolezsar not to work with Simpson, she did nothing to stop it.
Because it is undisputed that Simpson never had any communications with
Mower, then, as matter of law, Mower could not have engaged Simpson's services
as a real estate agent. The only person who could have engaged Simpson as a real
estate agent was Dolezsar. This raises two problems for Mower's case. First,
Dolezsar is deceased, and there is no evidence that he engaged Simpson as a real
estate agent. Second. Mower claims-adamantly-that Dolezsar was not her
agent. But if Dolezsar was not acting as an agent for Mower, as Mower claims,
then Dolezsar could only have hired Simpson to represent Dolezsar. Mower
cannot have it both ways. She cannot say that her husband was not her agent and
then argue that her husband was her agent for purposes of hiring Simpson as
Mower's real estate agent-something she specifically states she would never
authorize.

13

In her papers before the district court, Mower asked, "If Simpson was not
acting as a real estate agent, what was he doing?'' First, posing a question such as
this does not substitute for presenting facts supported by the record. The record
establishes that there was no real estate agreement and that Simps·on was not
compensated for his services. But, in any event, the answer to Mower's question is
that Simpson was helping his friend, Dolezsar.
In sum, Mower simply did not establish that there was a genuine issue of
material fact regarding either of the two key questions in this case. She did not
come forward with admissible evidence to show that her husband was not her
agent. And she did not come forward with admissible evidence to show that
Simpson was her real estate agent and that he owed her any duties as such.

B.

THE DECLARATION OF PAUL REEB DID NOT CREATE AN
FACTUAL DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.

Despite the foregoing, Mower argues in her brief to this Court that the
Declaration of Pa~l Reeb provided evidence that raised a genuine issue of material
fact and required the trial court to. deny the motion for summary judgment. As
shown below, this argument also fails.
The Reed declaration did not create a genuine issue of disputed fact because
the facts alleged by Mr. Reed are simply not material to the issues that were before
the district court. Reeb simply stated that Hobble Cree~ Investments "would have
taken any property contiguous to its own to make up the 10 acres." (R. 386.) At
14

_ best this testimony suggests merely that the transaction could have been structured
differently; it doesn't indicate that there was anything wrong with the way it was
. structured. Indeed, the testimony confirms that Hobble Creek Investrp.ents
_required ten contiguous acres and it received ten contiguous acres as agreed in the
contract signed by Hobble Creek Investments.
Summary judgment is not precluded whenever some fact may be disputed,
but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted. The statements made by
Paul Reeb were not material to the dispositive issues in this case. It simply does
not matter that the task of assembling properties could have been accomplished in
a different way than the one selected by Mower's husband. Mower's husband
made choices, and Mower is bound by them. Thus, district court did not err in
granting summary judgment.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE STATEMENTS AND OPINIONS OF MOWER WERE
INADMISSIBLE.

Mower asserts another argument on appeal. She claims that the district court
erred in finding that her own untimely declaration was inadmissible as evidence
because it was contradicted by her deposition testimony and because it contained
conclusions as opinions. This argument is also wrong.
A week after filing her opposition to Simpson's motion for summary
judgment, Mower filed a declaration with the district court. (R. 485-87.) The
15

district court properly ruled that the statements and opinions contained in the latefiled declaration were inadmissible.
''[A]n affiant may not 'raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which
contradicts his deposition unless he provides an explanation for the discrepancy."'
Best v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 2006 UT App 304, 113, 141 P.3d 624. There is

nothing in the Mower Declaration that is consistent with her prior sworn deposition
testimony, and .there is no explanation for the discrepancies.
Mower testified in her deposition that she gave Dolezsar a general power of
attorney and relied on him to take care of everything related to the acquisition of
the ranch property. By doing so she authorized everything that he did. Mower
testified that Dolezsar, her husband, knew every detail of every transaction that is
the subject of this lawsuit. And, by virtue of appointing Dolezsar as her agent,
Mower is deemed to have the same knowledge as Dolezsar had. Contrary to her
sworn deposition testimony, Mower attempted to avoid summary judgment by
stating in her declaration that she did not give Dolezsar any such authorization and
that she didn't know the details of the transactions. As to not knowing the details
of the transactions, this is completely irrelevant. It does nothing to establish that
Dolezsar was not her agent. As for Mower's claims that she did not authorize
Dolezsar to take certain specific actions, such claims are also irrelevant. Dolezsar
had broad authority. This fact is not changed by Mower's testimony that she did
16

not authorize each specific step that was taken along the way. Finally, to the extent
that Mower was attempting to argue that Dolezsar did not have any authority, such
a statement flatly contradicts her deposition testimony. And Mower cannot rely on
inconsistencies in her own testimony to create an issue of fact. The district court
did not err in ruling that the Mower Declaration was inadmissible and that it did
not raise any genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude the entry of
summary judgment.

III.

BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS. THE DISTRICT COURT
CORRECTLY RULED THAT SIMPSON WAS ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON EACH OF THE CAUSES
OF ACTION CONTAINED IN MOWER'S COMPLAINT.

Based·upon the undisputed facts, the district court correctly ruled that
Simpson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the causes of
action contained in Mower's complaint.
A.

FRAUD· AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.

The district· court correctly granted summary judgment against Mower on
her claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation because Mower did not come
·forward with any evidence that Simpson had made any false representations. First,
there is no evidence that Simpson made ~my representation at all. Mower testified
that she did not have any conversations with Simpson regarding any of the
transactions that are the subject of this action. Thus, any allegedly false
representation would have necessarily been made to Mower's husband, Dolezsar.
17

However, Dolezsar died whil~ Mower was in prison in California, and any claimed
statement by Dolezsar is barred by Rules 601 and 802 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. In short, there is no admissible evidence that there were any
representations made by Simpson to Mower regarding the acquisition or transfer of
the properties at issue in this case.
In addition, even if Mower could provide admissible evidence regarding
statements that were made by Simpson, the alleged statements referred to in
Mower's memorandum opposing summary judgment were true. In essence,
Mower claims that Simpson lied about the property that he was acquiri~g and that
he failed to transfer the property to Mower. The facts are that all of the property
purchased for the Mower horse ranch and equestrian center was deeded to
Mower's company-LD Ranch, LLC-on July 17, 2007, more than three years
prior to the time the Complaint was filed.
Mower's allegations seem to relate to some acreage that Simpson (acting
under Dolezsar's direction) traded as part of a deal to acquire property that was
necessary for the equestrian center. The property that was acquired as a result of
the trade is known as the "Thornhill Parcel," and it is the very parcel where the
equest!ian center now stands. There were no false representations made in
connection with trading that piece of property.
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Mower argues that the task could have been accomplished some other way
and that the Thornhill Parcel could have been obtained by trading different land.
Even if this is true, it is completely irrelevant. The fact that Dolezsar (with
Simpson's help) might have gone about the process differently is not a basis for
now alleging that Simpson defrauded Mower. Mower got exactly what she asked
her husband to acquire-a parcel on which she could build a horse ranch and
equestrian center. As a matter of law, there was no fraud or misrepresentation, and
the district court correctly granted summary judgment on these claims.

B.

BREACH-OF-FIDUCIARY DUTY.

The district court also properly granted summary judgment against Mower
on her breach-of-fiduciary duty claim. Mower alleges that the Simpson
Defendants breached fiduciary duties to her by acquiring property in their own
names and by keeping such property for their own use. The district court correctly
rejected these claims on summary judgment.
Mower's husband instructed Simpson to acquire property in names other
than Mower's. He could, of course, have instructed Simpson to acquire the parcels
in Mower's own name. However, if property owners in the canyon had learned
that Mower was trying to assemble a large parcel, they may have demanded more
money for their land. In any event, regardless of whether Mower's husband was
right or wrong in his strategy, it is undisputed that he instructed Simpson to acquire
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the parcels in names other than Mower's. This does not constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty.
The only involvement of Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC
in this case was that they acted as nominees to take title to property and then
transfer that title to Mower. At most, these companies had a contractual duty and
not a fiduciary duty. And Wood Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC
fulfilled their contractual duty when they transferred title to the properties to
Mower.
Mower alleges that Simpson, as a manager ofLD III, LC or LD Ranch,
LLC, owed a duty to those entities to not put his interests above the interests of
those entities. But there is no evidence that Simpson did so. Simpson did not
benefit from the transactions at issue. He merely assisted in the assembling of
property for a horse ranch and equestrian center, and he delivered to Mower the
property acquired for the horse ranch and equestrian center.
Mower alleges that Simpson breached his fiduciary duty by deeding some of
the acquired property to the owner of the Thornhill Parcel. However, as stated
above, certain property was traded in order to acquire the very parcel on which the
equestrian center sits. Could the deal have been put together differently? Perhaps.
But Simpson's actions in this regard hardly amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.
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Simpson did not put his own interests first and he did not acquire anything as a
result of the various transactions.
Further, the undisputed fact is that none of the Simpson Defendants were
engaged as a real estate agent for Mower. Thus, they did not owe Mower any
duties as a real estate agent:
Q.
If I understand your testimony so far today, is that you never
agreed that Simpson would be your real estate agent; is that correct?
A.
That is correct.
Q.
What I want to understand is did you see any document that
appointed Dave as your real estate agent?
A.
No. You will not find any document with my signature on it
that says he's my real estate agent.
Q.
Is there a document with Ken's signature on it whereby Dave is
appointed as a real estate agent?
A.
Not that I've seen.
(R. 544 at 42: 5-8 and 43: 4-10.)
In sum, Simpson was not acting as a real estate agent, and therefore was not
acting in a fiduciary capacity. Furthermore, as stated above, any claim that he was
acting as a real estate agent and breached a fiduciary duty is barred by the statute
of frauds. Utah Code Ann.§ 25-5-4(1)(e).

C.

CONVERSION.

The district court correctly granted summary judgment on Mower's claim
for conversion. The basis of Plaintiffs' Fifth Cause of Action for conversion is
stated in paragraph 1 ~ 4 of the complaint:
21

Simps~:m used Leslie's and LD Ill's funds for his own purposes when
he used them to purchase real property but acquired_ it in the name of
Wood Springs and/or Pheasant meadows, when he used the real
property for his own purposes and when he transferred part of the real
property to other parties.
(R. 119.) As set forth above, Wood Springs and Pheasant Meadows took title to
the property as nomi~ees at the request ofDolezsar. The properties acquired for
the horse ranch and equestrian center were then transferred to Mower more than
three years before this lawsuit was filed. There is no evidence that any of the
Simpson Defendants used any of the property for their own use. And there is
simply no evidence that any of the Simpson Defendants ended up with any of the
property. As a matter of law, they did not convert any of Mower's property for
their own use. As explained above, they did trade a parcel of property. But this
was for Mower's benefit, not their own. As a result of the trade the Simpson
Defendants acquired nothing, and Mower acquired the very piece of land on which
her equestrian center now sits. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment against Mower on her conversion claim.

D.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

Mower's next claim is that the Simpson Defendants were unjustly enriched.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim as well. As
stated above, Mower presented absolutely no evidence (and she does not cite any
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on appeal) that the Simpson Defendants ever used any property for their own use
or that Mower was ever deprived of the use of property.

E.

CONSPIRACY.

Mower did not present any admissible evidence of any conspiracy between
the defendants. The acquisition of property for Mower-including the trade of
some property in order to acquire land that was not on a hillside and on which the
equestrian center could be built-was achieved through arms-length negotiated
contracts. Mower presented no evidence to suggest otherwise, and the- district
court did not err in dismissing Mower's conspiracy claim.

IV.

IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING LEGAL ARGUMENTS, THE
DISTRICT COURT ALSO CORRECTLY RULED THAT MOWER'S
CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
If the Simpson Defendants (I) converted property, (2) breached fiduciary

duties, or (3) were unjustly enriched as a result of having the properties titled in
their own names, then such wrongs occurred when the parcels were acquired in
names other than Mower's. The Storrs Parcel closed on February 15, 2006. The
Crandall Parcel closed on March 3, 2006. The Olsen Parcel closed on July 3,
2006, and the last event to complete the closing of the Thornhill Parcel occurred on
August 27, 2006. All of the transactions were closed in the names of Wood
Springs, LLC and Pheasant Meadows, LLC, as nominees. Any claims of
conversion, breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment and conspiracy were
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barred within four years of each closing. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-3 07. The
complaint was not filed until November 12, 2010, which is more than four years
after each of the transactions.
The fraud and negligent misrepresentations claims were barred even earlier.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3), those claims were barred within three
years. Accordingly, those claims were barred no later than August 27, 2009, more
than a year before the complaint was filed.

V.
Gil .

MOWER DID NOT PRESENT ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
THAT SHE SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES.
With the exception of one parcel that Mower currently refuses to accept,

Mower received all of the property that was acquired for her horse ranch and
equestrian center. And the remaining parcel is available to Mower the moment she
accepts the deeds_prepared to accomplish that transfer. Accordingly, there is no
other property to transfer, and Mower has suffered no damages. Therefore, the
district court correctly granted summary judgment for this reason as well.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
district court.
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DATED this 24th day of February, 2016.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

~~

Craig Carlile
Brent b. Wride
Attorneys for Simpson Defendants
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